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Several years ago I had occasion to discourse at some length, in
delivering the annual Sonnett Lecture at Fordham Law School, upon
the judge's dilemma in assigning relative importance to the various
goals which for centuries society has agreed the sentencing process
should achieve.' It is commonplace to acknowledge the conceptual inconsistency which may result from grouping together that set of aims with
which the public at large, apparently expecting equal deference to be
given to each, equips the judiciary for its task of enforcing the criminal
law. For example, the approach of the "new" penology, whose origins
lie with the utilitarian philosophers of the nineteenth century, recognizes that "with respect to any particular delinquent... punishment
has three objects - incapacitation, reformation, and intimidation."2
For Jeremy Bentham, as for the school which has followed his view,
commitment was to be therapeutic for the offender, and protective of
the community whose rules he had broken. Yet there persists among
some today,3 as there did long before Bentham's time- the notion that
incarceration and other sanctions should be retributive as well, expressive of the moral revulsion we feel at the criminal's infliction of
injury upon our fellow man. And it requires little elaboration to
demonstrate that a prison term which properly conveys that moral
indignation might differ greatly from the sentence most propertly designed to rehabilitate the inmate.
The potential for disparate treatment of similar offenders which
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
FoRDHA L. REv. 495, 499-503 (1973).

I Kaufmnan, Prison: The Judge's Dilemma, 41

2J. BENTHAMr, THE RATIONALE OF PUkImnMENT 21 (1830).
3See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(4) (McKinney 1967).
4 See, e.g., Nmv YORK STATE CoMM'N ON ATncA, ATricA: TE

(1972).

OFFiciAL. REPORT 6

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:215

inheres in these conflicting ideals is supplemented by another difficulty.
Abstract and philosophical discussion of penal objectives must, of
course, be pursued; but judges are daily called upon to apply the tentative consensus of these societal deliberations to convicted offenders of
almost infinitely variegated temperaments, histories, and economic
circumstances. It appears too obvious to require argument that, even
if we were to agree on the relative priorities to assign to deterrence,
rehabilitation, isolation from the community, and retribution, differences among individuals would still present us with the phenomenon
of sentencing disparity to which so much attention has recently been
devoted. Thus, the calculus whose outcome is a term of years seems to
require differentiation along two wholly distinct scales: the personal
as well as the theoretical.
There is, however, an important distinction which must be made
between these quite independent problems. What is considered under
the too general rubric of "sentencing disparity" may be acceptable
when it results from what I have chosen to call "personal" reasons,
although it is completely unjustifiable when it results solely from
"theoretically" inconsistent views held by different judges. An example
would help to illustrate this point. Recently, a panel on which I sat and
for which I wrote the opinion affirmed an order granting writs of
habeas corpus to several hundred young adults who had been sentenced
under the reformatory sentence provisions of former New York Penal
Law Article 75.5 That statute, which had been prospectively repealed
shortly before our decision, 6 provided misdemeanants between the
ages of 16 and 21 with terms of unspecified duration, to terminate
either upon discharge on parole, or after service of four years of confinement. The purpose of this reformatory sentence was "to provide
education, moral guidance and vocational training for young offenders," 7 and to achieve this goal New York provided special institutions, programs, and parole officers uniquely for young adult offenders.
In 1970, however, the Correction Law was amended to abolish the
distinction between reformatories and prisons." Thereafter, youths who
had been given four-year terms were confined indiscriminately with
adults who had committed the same crimes, and who were incarcerated
under conditions which the Penal Law recognized as punitive. 9 The
anomaly which resulted was that adult offenders who had committed
5United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974).
74
6 N.Y. Sass. LAws [19
],ch. 652, § 7 (McKinney).
7 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 75.10, commentary at 156 (McKinney 1967).
8 N.Y. COEGCTION LAW art. 4 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
9 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(4) (McKinney 1967).
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exactly the same crimes received substantially lesser sentences - to be
served in the same institutions -because the law supposed that the
young adult group was being rehabilitated, while the adults were being
punished. 10
The inconsistency is by no means peculiar to the legislative branch.
Indeed, it may well appear even more frequently among a group of
judges. Some will impose stiffer sentences than others because they
have attached differing significance to the goals which they believe
society wishes to achieve through the penal law. Whether the disparity
of sentencing is created by the legislative or the judicial branch, our
sense of fairness is pricked by the inequality.
We do not feel as outraged, and perhaps rightly so, when those who
have committed the same crimes are penalized differently because of
characteristics peculiar to their individual cases. Whether preeminence
be assigned to the need for rehabilitating the criminal, or isolating him
as a danger to the community, or punishing him because he has transgressed the most basic social norms, our judgment of the proper length
of sentence cannot but be affected by such factors as prior criminal
record, ignoble motive, perjury, and so forth. In so saying I am, of
course, making no novel statement. Indeed, the Project for an Italian
Penal Code more than 50 years ago presented a schedule of conditions
evidencing greater or less "dangerousness" to be used by the sentencing
judge." Seventeen circumstances requiring greater punishment were
enumerated, including "dishonesty of prior personal, family or social
life;... [p]rior judicial and penal record;... [albuse of trust in public
or private matters or malicious violation of special duties ...."12 Eight
mitigating circumstances were also set forth, among which were
"[h]onesty of prior personal, family and social life; ... [h]aving acted
from excusable motives or motives of public interest; ... having acted
in a state of excusable passion... ; [h]aving acted through... special
and transitory conditions of health or through unknown material cir18
cumstances ....
We must be cautious, however, lest our recognition of the propriety of a consideration of such individual differences cause us to overlook the possibility that considering each of these factors and attaching
10 See also Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 913
(1972).
11 . FERRi, RELAZIONE SUL PROGETro PRELMNARE nI CODICE PENALE ITALIANO 7 (1921).
12 Id. at 553-54, 842-48.
Is Id. at 154, 344-45. These and other provisions of the Italian Project's Penal Code
are discussed in Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HAv.L. RLv. 455, 467-75
(1928).
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various weights may lead to unfair discrimination. The welter of attitudes and circumstances which distinguish one defendant from another
almost defies description. And yet if we are to hold fast to our hope for
equal justice under the law, we must make a confirmed effort both to
isolate the factors which may be considered by the sentencing judge,
and to determine the weight which each deserves. 14 To be sure, this
task is no less difficult than - and is in fact related to - that which we
face in coming to some agreement over the policies underlying the sanctions imposed. But it would seem that, even without an explicit definition of priorities, we could achieve a considerable measure of uniformity merely by restricting our efforts at reform to the realm of the
personal.
In an attempt to make some progress along these strictly pragmatic
lines, I appointed in July of 1973 a Committee on Sentencing Practices,
to study the nature and extent of sentence disparity in the Second Circuit, and to bring to the problem solutions which would be at once
imaginative and practical. The recently released Sentencing Study,
prepared by the Federal Judicial Center and conducted under the direction of the Committee headed by former Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard, 15 illustrates well the method of inquiry which I suggest may be
most fruitful. Eschewing any attempt to resolve the theoretical dilemma
posed by the existence of several goals in the sentencing process, the
study instead focused on the problem of disparity as it appeared to be
related to particular case characteristics. The result was one which
many had long suspected. Substantial variations appeared in length
and type of sentence imposed by different judges, even where the underlying facts were the very same. 16 It is important to note, though, that
the intra-circuit disparity which did not appear to result from the con14 This suggestion is, of course, by no means unique. For a somewhat similar proposal, see Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 CINN. L. REv. 1, 53 (1972) (proposing a
National Commission to enact rules "about factors to be weighed in mitigation or aggravation of prison sentences").
15 FEDmAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO
THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (Aug. 1974).
161 shall cite but one striking example. Identical groups of 20 presentence reportsdrawn from actual cases, but with the identifying facts altered-were sent to a number
of district judges. The 20 cases selected were broadly representative of the criminal business of the Second Circuit's district courts. The first defendant in those groups was a union
official convicted after trial of extortionate credit transactions and related income-tax
violations. Additional information was provided concerning the official's prior record,
narcotics use, sex, current employment, and so forth. Sentences imposed by the 26 judges
considering the case ranged from 3 years' imprisonment to 20 years' imprisonment and a
$65,000 fine. Twelve judges would have sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment or more;
twelve judges would have sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and a $20,000 fine or
less. Proportionate disparities appeared throughout the other 19 test cases. Id. at Table
1 & p. A-4.
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firmed predilections of various judges for more severe or more lenient
punishments. If we may assume a consistent ranking of theoretical goals
on the part of each, we can, I think, rightly conclude that the problem
of disparity stems in large measure from an uncertainty over the relevance and importance of the myriad characteristics which combine to
make each offender a special case.
So to conclude is to take a long but, it must be emphasized, only a
preliminary, step toward the resolution of this very serious problem.
The Sentencing Study also made an attempt, perhaps necessarily less
successful, to isolate and determine the weight given by various judges
to those factors which it thought most likely to influence judgment concerning the proper length of sentence.' 7 In saying "perhaps necessarily
less successful," I have chosen my words carefully, for the accuracy with
which the empirical sciences can reproduce the heart-wrenching reality
of the actual sentencing process is limited. Indeed, the Study itself gave
explicit recognition to this problem in emphasizing the tentative nature
of its conclusions.' s Despite these difficulties, I expect that the Committee's further deliberations - which continue even now - will result, like the Study already published, in the most significant contributions to eradication of the ancient and widespread phenomenon of sentencing disparity.
What I wish to emphasize is that work must be done along lines
supplemental to those pursued by the Sentencing Committee. If much
remains to be done before we have completed the Herculean task of
cataloguing and determining the importance of those personal characteristics which should influence the sentencing decision, I suggest that
we have ready at hand the surest and most efficient method for achieving it. For sentences are daily imposed in all the trial courts of the
17

Thus the Study considered, for example, the effect of the probation office recom-

mendation on the length of sentence imposed. It also attempted to determine the importance which various judges assigned to the fact of heroin addiction, and the existence
of a prior criminal record. Further consideration was given to the significance of conviction after plea, as opposed to trial. Finally, tvo of the test cases sought to weigh the
effect which socio-economic considerations had on sentence disparity. Although the Study
did not attempt to substantiate the criticism that white collar criminals are treated more

leniently than blue collar offenders, these latter cases sought evidence of more exaggerated disparity within each of those two classes. Id. at 41-54.
18 Among the more obvious difficulties, to which the Study gave explicit recognition,
was the fact that the sentences were rendered under experimental conditions which did
not give the judges an opportunity to form any personal impressions of the defendant
on the basis of face-to-face contact. A somewhat related variable was that those imposing
the penalties knew that their decisions would have no consequences for actual offenders,
their families, or victims. Some understatement of the extent of disparity was also
thought to stem from the use of identical presentence reports in all the controlled
cases. Id. at 11-20.
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federal system. It is strange indeed, and lamentable, that in the great
majority of these cases we have not the slightest idea upon what those
determinations are based. We can, of course, rely with some assurance
upon the assumption that the judge will thoroughly consider and
honestly weigh all available and relevant evidence. But it does not
strain the imagination to suppose that some things of importance will
be overlooked and that matters considered will be assigned varying
degrees of significance by judges of differing dispositions and backgrounds. Appellate courts, although they have noted the salutary purposes which could be served by demystifying the presently murky practice, have in the ordinary case declared their impotence to remedy the
situation through their supervisory powers. 19 Though it would take me
far afield to discuss the merits of review by one tribunal over another,
the absence of any form of review makes impossible some clarification at
a second level.20 And even in special cases, such as the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, 21 where a statutory mandate might have been read to

impose a requirement of some reasoned elaboration, the time-honored
22
practice of judicial inscrutability has carried the day.

In addition to serving as a desirable prelude to some thoroughgoing and perhaps legislatively enacted reform, lifting this veil of
secrecy would perform a second much-needed service. For the shroud
which now envelops the convicted defendant as he moves away from
the constitutionally enforced publicity of trial cannot but have its
harmful effect on his perception of the criminal justice system. Judge
Marvin Frankel pointed out,
19 Elaboration by the sentencing judge upon the reasons for his decision has been
required under only the most limited conditions. Among these are cases where a penalty
was imposed on misinformation of a constitutional magnitude, see, e.g., United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); cases
where a simultaneous sentence and conviction upon a more serious count were later
overturned, see, e.g., McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972); and situations
where the court failed to consider substantial mitigating circumstances, see, e.g., United
States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1970).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1973).
21 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1970) requires, before a youth offender is sentenced under an
applicable penalty provision other than the Federal Youth Corrections Act, that the
court "shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under"
the Act.
22 Despite the holdings of several appellate courts that § 5010 required an explicit
finding of "no benefit" coupled with supporting reasons for resort to the alternate
penalty, see, e.g., United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United
States v. Toy, 482 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Supreme Court declined to interpret the
section as demanding anything more than a statement by the district judge that the
offender would not benefit from the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act. Dorszynski
v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 3042 (1974).

1975]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE-FOREWORD

When the sentence is imposed, the darkness deepens for the defendant; there usually is... little or nothing to show that a reasoned
judgment is being rendered. This is not to imagine that the average defendant, doomed to a term of confinement, is likely to find
pleasure or solace in a coherent rationale for the affliction. It is to
say that the failure to explain, especially in the light of the ample
time for later brooding, lends a quality of baleful mystery rather
than open justice. At the least, the absence of an explanation does
nothing to quell the disposition to suspect unfairness, fired later
by encounters with prisoners who have much lighter sentences
or are perceived to be (or,
based upon circumstances that seem,
23
simply, are) essentially identical.
I have said that a requirement of elaboration upon the reasons for
each sentencing decision would assist both to identify factors considered -

some of which we may not in fact have suspected -

and to

pinpoint the significance assigned to each factor, thus hopefully providing a target toward which legislative reform can most effectively be
directed. It would also offer some reassurance to the criminal, whose
life is most acutely affected, that his liberty is not being revoked in a
wholly arbitrary fashion. I believe still a third end might be accomplished by this actually quite modest expedient. It has been commonly
supposed that the very singularity of each crime and criminal makes
any attempt at development of uniform standards not only doomed to
failure, but even undesirable. 24 Viewed from a different perspective,
this is in fact to suggest that the very problem which we are considering
is its own justification. As the ostrich-like quality of this supposition
becomes increasingly evident, however, I believe that it wil begin to
appear with equal clarity that the singular virtue of the common law
may be exercised to good effect. For the silence which has heretofore
characterized the post-conviction process has not only bred suspicion
among the guilty; it has also imposed an undesirable insularity upon
the judges themselves, forcing them to act unassisted by the accumulated wealth of prior and contemporary opinion upon which they can
draw in so many other fields. The necessary result has been that individual judges act only within the limits of their own wisdom, which,
even at the end of their tenure, does not exceed that of the rest of
fallible men.
If, instead, each sentence which was imposed were to be accom23 Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 CINN. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1972).
24 See, e.g., Dix, JudicialReview of Sentences: Implications for Individual Disposition,
1969 LAW AND TnE SociAL ORDER 869.
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panied by a declaration of those characteristics of the criminal's background, demeanor, motives, and attitude, and those peculiarities of the
crime, which the sentencing judge took into account, and a statement
of the importance which he found each should be assigned, the situation
might be considerably ameliorated. A judge concerned to discover the
precise mitigating effect which other judges allotted to the fact of narcotics addiction, or to the fact that a particular defendant had two concerned parents, or had been employed for several years at the same job,
would have empirical evidence upon which to rely. It is true that even
this sort of enumeration and weighing would still fall short of capturing the uniqueness of the convicted individual whom the judge confronted. But I cannot help but think that achieving a consensus regarding these recurring symptoms, and forcing the judiciary to think
about its own decision-making process, would exert a beneficial influence to rationalize the procedure which now is too easily characterized
25
as capricious.
25 A further significant purpose which could be served by requiring a statement of

reasons is a reduction of the risk that the sentencing judge might rely on misinformation
contained in the presentence report. See United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d
Cir. 1973). For once the court's misapprehension had been disclosed, the convicted defendant would be offered a much more meaningful opportunity to apply for reduction
of sentence even within existing procedures. FED. R. Cam . P. 35.
It has also been suggested that the court's statement of reasons "could prove to be of
considerable assistance to prison and parole authorities in later determining the type of
institution in which the defendant should be incarcerated and the time and conditions
of parole." United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1173 (2d Cir. 1973).

